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This study seeks to study relevant precedent cases concerning affirmative action, the 14th 
Amendment equal protection clause, the 5th Amendment equal protection clause, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, with the goal of predicting how certain justices will vote in the affirmative 
action case, Fisher vs. University of Texas at Austin. I conclude that justices will debate numerous 
aspects at play, such as original intent, plain meaning, precedent, policy preferences, public 
opinion, personal experience, the federal government, and interest groups in order to take 
positions in the Fisher vs. the University of Texas at Austin case for the second time around with 
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When the Supreme Court accepts a case for a decision on the merits presented by a party, 
it initiates a grueling decision-making process amongst nine justices with the objective of 
providing an immediate outcome for the parties to the case and a statement of general legal rules 
that apply to the nation (Baum 2013). Scholars have inquired about methods of this judicial 
process, and there is disagreement within the legal community about how the justices decide 
cases the way they do because it is the product of maybe not just one, but multiple intertwined 
forces that vary in importance amongst the justices that, operating together, shape decisions 
(Baum, p. 148). The following is a list that functions as a comprehensive theory of judicial 
decision making where both legal and political influences serve as justices’ guiding framework 
for interpretation. Justices may take into consideration plain meaning of the words that are in the 
law, original intent of the framers of the Constitution or legislators, precedent, policy 
preferences, mass public opinion, personal experience, government institutions, and interest 
groups when choosing their positions for a case. Incorporating plain meaning and precedent are 
techniques that fall under the role of law as a component in decision making (Baum, pgs. 114-
147 Epstein & Walker, pgs. 21-44).  
Policy preferences, mass public opinion, personal experience, interest groups, and 
government are influences and techniques that fall under the broad role of politics and values in 
the second component of decision making. The majority of justices at least reflect on all of these 
at some point before coming to a decision because the Constitution is sometimes ambiguous and 
the various cases that come before the Court evoke non-legal considerations. However, there is 
little support from court members in admitting that they consider these factors alongside the 
dominant force of legality (Epstein, p. 33). In this essay, I will explain how three out of nine 
justices – Ruth Ginsburg, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia – have taken into consideration 
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one or more of these principles over the course of their October 2014 term. Specifically, I will 
study relevant precedent cases concerning affirmative action, the 14th Amendment equal 
protection clause, the 5th Amendment equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
with the goal of predicting how they will vote in the affirmative action case, Fisher vs. 
University of Texas at Austin (2015). First, it is critical to understand what these influences mean 
and how they can be measured in various ways to see if it they play a role in justices’ votes.  
Plain meaning, or textualism, is an approach where justices’ interpretations lie verbatim 
to the words of constitutional provisions and does not explore further meaning than the words 
therein. Justice Scalia explains how he adheres to this in his essay, A Matter of Interpretation. He 
asserts that the Constitution tells us not to nit-pick at detail, but to give words and phrases an 
expansive rather than narrow interpretation, and not an interpretation that the language will not 
bear (Scalia, p.37). I include this influence because he explicitly showed that it is important to 
his decision making. Measuring justices’ preference for this approach can be determined by the 
frequency in which they cite definitions in the case opinion, defining words of the Constitution 
(Baum, p. 117).  
Original intent is an approach that acknowledges that the framers of the Constitution 
chose their language carefully, so it is the court’s duty to determine what the meaning of the 
language was (Epstein, p. 23). Many Supreme Court opinions contemplate the original intent of 
the framers, and Justice Thomas regularly uses this approach. Thomas wrote in part of the 
plurality opinion of a major case called Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (2007): 
"My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: 'Our Constitution is colorblind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' And my view was the rallying cry for 
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the lawyers who litigated Brown.” He believes that the 14th Amendment equal protection clause 
bans any preferential treatment of minorities. 
In the Seattle case, the majority ruled that public school systems cannot seek to achieve 
or maintain integration through measures that take explicit account of a student’s race. Seattle 
public school programs sought to maintain school-by-school diversity by limiting transfers on 
the basis of race or using race as a tiebreaker for admission to particular high schools. While 
Scalia joined the majority, Justice Ginsburg joined the dissenting opinion with three others 
agreeing that the ruling undermines Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary 
education that local communities have sought to make a reality (Greenhouse). Justice Ginsburg 
does not follow the original intent of the framers of the Constitution, like Justices Thomas and 
Scalia, rather she believes in a living constitution. Some critics say that Scalia’s brand of legal 
interpretation is an impediment toward progress to today's standards of racial and gender 
equality. 
 Measuring justices’ usage for this approach of original intent can be done by determining 
the frequency in which they reflect upon the framers or legislators discussing their opinion 
concerning a dispute of the law.  Stare decisis is a term that means “let the decision stand,” 
referring to a rule that has been long established within the courts that justices should decide 
cases based on previously established precedent in history (Baum, p. 30). This particular 
technique is valuable in that it generates predicable direction and stable law. With this in mind, 
the court rarely reverses its previous decisions and instead honors them. Whether a justice is 
writing a majority, dissent, or concurring opinion, citing precedents is a common basis upon 
which the opinion is based. 
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Stare decisis can be used as a means of measuring precedent’s influence on a justice’s 
decision. It is rare for the Court to take cases that are almost identical to precedent because the 
issue has already been ruled upon and they have to be selective due to the 7,000 cases on average 
they receive. On the contrary, the Court decided to take on Fisher v. University of Texas once 
again (Baum, p. 120). Sometimes when constitutional issues are involved, stare decisis may be 
overlooked (Epstein, p. 31). According to Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker, “Of the 129 
precedent cases overruled between 1953 and 2001, about two-thirds involved constitutional 
issues.”  
Justice Thomas would account for this as he has written many opinions where he feels 
inclined to do so if precedent is faulty. Justice Scalia even insisted that Justice Thomas does not 
believe in stare decisis (Baum, p. 121). Herman Pritchett, one of the first scholars to study the 
importance of justices’ personal attitudes, concluded during the 1940s that the justices were not 
following precedent; rather, they were motivated by their own preferences (Epstein & Walker, p. 
34). Policy preferences are key techniques that vary more than any other influence from one 
justice to another. Justices’ personal history—such as their family socialization, religion, career 
activities, etc.—mold their attitudes to take stances on policy issues. 
 Justices can take positions on cases that reflect their views of good policy before and 
during their appointment and advance ones they favor by swaying other justices. Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg offer this insight into their personal ideology because they frequently 
speak to the press and write about judicial issues (Baum, p.22). It is harder to determine 
influences for justices we know less about, even though court opinions provide some insight. 
Particular policy preferences are organized as taking either a liberal or conservative position. 
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Liberal or conservative positions containing specific policy preferences concern civil liberty and 
economic issues.  
Baum (2013) defines the liberal position of the Court as giving relatively heavy weight to 
the right of equal treatment by government and private institutions, procedural rights of criminal 
defendants, and substantive rights such as freedom of expression and privacy.  
A conservative position, rather, gives great weight to values such as effective law enforcement 
and national security, which compete with the rights Liberals support. Conservatives are also less 
favorable to any government regulation of business practices (Baum, p. 124). Whether a 
particular justice is liberal or conservative depends on the frequency by which justices cast 
liberal or conservative votes (see figures 1-3, which compare the ideological direction of the 
decision to the ideological direction of the justice on a case-by-case basis). Research with mixed 
results seemingly implies that the influence of public opinion is not as notable as other 
considerations towards justice’s decision making, but it is worth highlighting as it is relevant to 
the case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. 
  Many students, parents, faculty, and universities as a whole across the country care about 
and have an opinion on the issue of using affirmative action in university admissions decisions. 
Justices might be swayed consciously or unconsciously to take what they perceive as the more 
popular side (Baum, p.141). According to surveys collected by the Pew Research Center in 2014 
sampling 3,335 adults in the U.S., 63% of Americans said affirmative action programs designed 
to increase the number of black and minority students was a “good thing” compared to 30%  who 
disagreed (Pew Research).  
Public support from the general community and political officials strengthen the Court’s 
ability to secure acceptance of its decisions whereas those who are responsible for carrying out 
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those decisions can also limit or overturn them (Baum, p. 140). The influence of public opinion 
is also existent in court opinions where justices legitimize their reasoning by attaching a 
jurisprudential standard to the law such as looking at, “evolving standards of decency,” when 
determining whether a punishment violates the 8th Amendment (Epstein & Walker, p. 40).  The 
court often must depend on the executive and legislative branch to give its decisions legitimacy 
so they may take these policymakers into account when they reach decisions (Epstein & Walker, 
p. 42). The most applicable governmental influence involving the case of Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin would be the U.S. solicitor general representing the United States as an interest 
group in favor of the University of Texas.  
According to data located in the Supreme Court Compendium, the Solicitor General’s 
office generally is able to convince the justices to adopt its preferred position (Epstein & Walker, 
p. 42). Out of 8 civil rights cases brought before the Roberts Court (from 2005-09) 62.5% of the 
time the United States won the case, and out of 102 cases total during that time period, 66.4% of 
the time the United States won (Epstein, p. 716) 
Personal or life experiences are yet another major influence over the Court that editor and 
founder of Scotusblog, Amy Howe, recently elaborated quite well on at a University of Florida 
lecture this year (2015). Howe believes that having broader experiences gives us better law and 
gives the Court a little bit more legitimacy (2015).  
She mentioned the following various examples of how the justices are influenced by their 
own personal experiences as evidence. Justice Sotomayor once admitted that based on her gender 
and Latino heritage, she views a case differently from any other justice. A memoir written by 
Justice Clarence Thomas described him growing up in Savannah, Georgia, where he spent most 
of his childhood growing up poor. He remembered the Ku Klux Klan having a convention with 
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nearly 250 members parading down the city’s main streets. Decades later, he was on the bench 
when the Court heard Virginia v. Black. Virginia v. Black involved a challenge to a Virginia 
criminal law that made it a crime to burn a cross with intent to intimidate someone. Justice 
Thomas, who rarely speaks before the Court, did so in this case expressing his concern over the 
Federal Government’s actions minimizing the symbolism and effects of the burning cross (Howe 
2015).  
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, said the burning cross was intended to cause fear and 
terrorize the population. He said in every culture certain things acquire meaning in which 
outsiders cannot comprehend. He said there was a common understanding of the Klan as a 
terrorist organization, and cross burning was a symbol intending lawlessness to instill fear and 
threaten physical violence. Therefore, he dismissed the majority’s assertion that a burning cross 
is not always intended to intimidate, such an act can also be a statement of ideology. This 
connection is direct evidence of the influence of personal experience on his vote. In regards to 
affirmative action, Justice Thomas says it is racially discriminating. Thomas suffered stigma 
attending Yale where white students said he was admitted based on racial quotas. He also had a 
difficult time finding a job because employers thought he received special treatment being a 
product of affirmative action (Amy Howe). However, Thomas eventually found his way and 
became (interestingly enough) an assistant secretary for civil rights at the Department of 
Education in the Reagan administration. Additionally, he joined the Office of Civil Rights and 
held position as Chairperson of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
(Harvard Law, p. 9 & 10). Thomas’ seven-page dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger (which I will go 
into detail later in this essay) stated that he believes minorities can survive and make 
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achievements without the interference of university administrators or the majority race in the 
U.S. (Harvard Law, p. 37) 
As for Ruth Bader Ginsburg, she experienced gender discrimination that women today 
would find unimaginable. When she went on to attend Cornell University, they had a policy 
where females had no choice but to live in dormitories so the University could provide proper 
supervision over them. There was also a quota of 4 men to every 1 woman because space was 
limited. She was famously asked by a dean of Harvard Law School to justify taking the place of 
a man that would otherwise be in the class. Ginsburg had trouble finding jobs after law school, 
and at one point, Justice Frankfurter refused to conduct an interview with her because he thought 
it would be inappropriate to have a woman as a law clerk. At the time, many sign-up sheets for 
law firm interviews specified men only. She eventually landed a job as a clerk for a New York 
district judge who only hired her after a law professor promised him that he had a male student at 
Harvard standing by to take her place if things didn’t work out. Ginsburg once stated to the press 
during the case of Safford v. Redding that some of her colleagues would not understand what a 
13-year-old girl has gone through because they did not have the same experience as her. She also 
said being Jewish, a woman, growing up in Brooklyn, and even attending a summer camp 
provided her with a different life experience and perspective than the other justices (Howe). 
Lastly, interest groups supporting parties’ cases before the Supreme Court influence the 
Court’s policies. Opinions of the Court address the arguments raised by the interest groups 
during oral argument of Fisher v. University of Texas. The government as an interest group wins 
justices’ support far more often when its arguments also accord with justices’ ideological 
positions (Baum, p. 145). The percentage of cases won (as mentioned earlier) puts the federal 
government in the best position to benefit from positive perceptions of the justices. Overall, 
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cases dealing with affirmative action attract far more participation from interest groups. For 
example, Regents v. Bakke was a case that involved admission of minority students to medical 
school where more than 100 organizations participated as interest groups split between both 
parties ((Epstein & Walker, p. 43). In comparison, 14 amicus briefs were filed in support of 
Petitioner Abigail Fisher and a massive 67 just for the University of Texas at Austin.  
Moving forward, I will explore the background, constitutional issue, and arguments made 
surrounding affirmative action and the current case before the court, Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin. Affirmative action is an outcome of the 1960’s Civil Rights Movement, 
intended to break the barriers that a history of discrimination made for minority groups and 
women at a disadvantage by providing them with equal opportunities in education and 
employment. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, in 1965 only 5 percent 
of undergraduate students were African American (NCSL). Of the 17.5 million undergraduate 
students in fall 2013, about 9.9 million were white (57%), 2.9 million were Hispanic (17%), 2.5 
million were African American (14%), and 1 million were Asian (6%) (2014). In 1997, the 
Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors 
who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes (Oyez).  
After the University of Texas found that there were racial and ethnic differences within 
the undergraduate and state population, they modified its race-neutral admissions policy. The 
new policy took into account the top ten percent of in-state students for admission and then 
considered various factors for the rest of the applicants outside of the ten percent of their high 
school classes including a list of variables under academic and personal achievement indexes. 
The academic index is calculated based on standardized test scores and class rank, while the 
personal index calculated reflects weighted average of applicant’s essays (2 required), leadership 
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abilities, awards, honors, work experience, extracurricular activities, socioeconomic status, 
family status, and race. However, no numerical values are ever assigned to any components of 
the PAI Index. Abigail Fisher, who was a white Texas resident, applied to the University of 
Texas and was denied admission in the summer and fall of 2008 (Cornell).  
Fisher had a Liberal Arts AI of 3.1 and a Business AI of 3.1, because nearly all the seats 
in the undeclared major program in Liberal Arts were filled with Top Ten Percent students she 
would only be admitted if her AI exceeded 3.5 regardless of a perfect PAI score. Fisher claimed 
that her academic credentials exceeded those of admitted minority applicants. Fisher competed 
against 17,131 applicants for the remaining 1,216 seats for Texas residents that year in the fall. 
She moved forward with her claim by suing the University and challenging their admissions 
policy for their use of race as violating the 14th Amendment equal protection clause. The 
University of Texas defended by saying their use of race was a narrowly tailored means of 
achieving their interest in diversity and it is a single factor among many that are holistically 
reviewed in admissions (Cornell).  
The United States District Court upheld the legality of the University’s admission policy 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Fisher appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to 
consider this question and the justices returned a 7-1 decision partially in her favor. The Court 
ruled that the 14th Amendment permits the consideration of race in university admissions 
decisions but only under a standard of strict judicial scrutiny. The Court of Appeals judgement 
was incorrect because they failed to verify or sufficiently examine whether the University policy 
could have used other race-neutral alternatives that would provide the same benefits of diversity 
(Santoro and Wirth). If the University does not satisfy strict judicial scrutiny, race cannot be used 
as a factor in admission decisions. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Fifth 
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Circuit Court of Appeals to revisit the issue to make sure the policy can sustain strict scrutiny 
review and reaffirmed the Grutter rule (Cornell).  
After the benefit of additional briefing, oral argument, and exacting scrutiny, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of the University of Texas again. Abigail 
Fisher on appeal to the Supreme Court again begs the question whether the use of racial 
preferences in university admissions can be sustained under Court interpretations of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Fisher now argues that strategically vague polices, shifting rationales, and 
stereotypical assumptions should not be permitted to triumph over her individual right to equal 
protection under the law and the polices still do not survive strict scrutiny because 86% of the 
African American and Hispanic students who enrolled in the fall of 2008 were admitted via the 
Top Ten Percent Plan. The University of Texas argues that Petitioner Abigail Fisher lacks 
standing due to her relief being moot so she does not meet Article III’s minimum requirements. 
Also, they assert a compelling interest to consider race and the individualized consideration of 
race was necessary to complement the Top Ten Percent law.  
The United States, as the major interest group in this case, asserts a critical national 
interest in qualified and diverse graduates for the Armed Forces. They argue the university 
concretely defines its educational objectives without identifying a demographic goal and it had 
not attained sufficient diversity to fully provide educational benefits in 2004 and 2008. The 
University of Texas alleged that it increased recruitment and budget spending having regional 
admission centers in particular areas in Texas and promotional campaigns toward minority 
applicants in response to diversity “plummeting” from the Hopwood decision. Educational 
benefits were defined in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher as bringing unique perspectives to classroom 
debates, breaking down isolation and stereotypes, and cross-racial understanding. In the direct 
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precedent to this case, Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court ruled that the University of 
Michigan’s admission policy stressing diversity through “critical mass” did not violate the 14th 
Amendment and critical mass was not equal to a quota, which would violate the 14th 
Amendment, decided by Regents v. Bakke).  
Based just on prior opinions, concurrences and dissents, it is clear that Justices Scalia and 
Thomas would not uphold the University of Texas’ admission policy (see figures 1 and 2) but 
Justices Ginsburg probably would. While it can be difficult to predict the actual outcomes of the 
case, some additional insight was provided listening to oral argument of this case to support my 
prediction. During oral argument, Justice Scalia asserted that diversity may not serve minority 
students well. He opposed remand to the District Court, arguing that the University of Texas is 
not entitled to a second chance to develop the record. Justice Ginsburg suggested that the Top 
Ten Percent Plan was designed to improve racial diversity and pointed out for a second time 
around that injunctive relief was not possible due to the fact that Ms. Fisher graduated from 
another institution already so there was no class action. Justice Thomas did not speak. 
To conclude, I believe that the justices will take in all the numerous considerations such 
as original intent, plain meaning, precedent, policy preferences, public opinion, personal 
experience, the federal government, and interest groups in order to take positions in the Fisher 
vs. the University of Texas at Austin case the second time around because I think the justices 
intended to take the case on with an intent to make a moving statement on affirmative action. 
Taking the provided information into account accordingly, I believe justices Ginsburg will vote 
in favor of the University of Texas. Scalia and Thomas will vote in favor of Abigail Fisher. I also 
think that Justice Roberts, Alito, and possibly Kennedy will vote in favor of Abigail Fisher. Only 
13
Renkor: Analyzing the Roles of Law and Politics in Judicial Decision Maki
Published by The Keep, 2016
Renkor 14 
 
time will tell when we are able to find out the fate of affirmative action or if the 5th Circuit Court 
of Appeals will get shot down again.   
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